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PAY UP OR ZIP UP: GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION 
It is “better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . .  Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”1  These infamous words written by 
Justice Holmes in 1927 allowing state ordered sterilization have been the 
source of controversy and debate for the last seventy-six years.  Throughout 
this time, state courts and the United States Supreme Court have continuously 
grappled with the idea of what kind of protection to afford an individual in 
regard to his right to procreate.  While mandatory sterilization is not as 
prominent a remedy these days,2 the latest trend3 is to condition a criminal’s 
probation on the promise that he or she will not procreate during the 
probationary period. 
This note will examine a person’s right to procreate in light of the recent 
Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Oakley.4  After a historical 
analysis of the right to privacy, this note will consider what constitutional 
standard should be used to examine the right to procreate.  The analysis will 
then turn to a comparison of rights lost while in prison against those lost while 
on probation and will ultimately conclude that rights infringed upon while on 
probation are subject to a lesser standard of constitutional scrutiny than the 
infringement of fundamental rights of a free person.  This note will argue that 
the decision in Wisconsin v. Oakley to make probation conditional on a 
promise not to procreate is both constitutional and a valuable alternative to 
prison. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Wisconsin v. Oakley, Defendant David Oakley, the father of nine 
children by four different women intentionally refused to make child support 
 
 1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 2. See generally Jason O. Runckel, Note, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California’s 
Mandatory Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547 (1997) (discussing the growing use of 
mandatory chemical castration for repeat sex offenders). 
 3. See generally Dee McAree, Deadbeat Dads Told to Stop Having Kids, NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 
26, 2002), available at http://law.com. 
 4. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). 
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payments and was behind in payments in excess of $25,000.5  The circuit court 
rationalized that had Mr. Oakley paid something or made an earnest effort to 
pay anything, he would not be in court that day.  Recognizing that if Mr. 
Oakley went to prison, he would not be in a position to support any of his 
children, Judge Hazelwood sentenced him to three years in prison on the first 
count, imposed and stayed an eight-year term on the two other counts, and 
imposed a five-year term of probation consecutive to his incarceration.  His 
probation was conditioned on that fact that “while on probation, Oakley [could 
not] have any more children unless he demonstrate[d] that he had the ability to 
support them and that he [was] supporting the children he already had.”6  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that in light of the ongoing victimization 
of Oakley’s nine children and his record of disregard for the law, the condition 
of not procreating unless he can support that child and his current children is 
not overly broad and is reasonably related to Oakley’s rehabilitation.7  Mr. 
Oakley argued that the condition imposed by Judge Hazelwood violated his 
constitutional right to procreate, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reasoned 
that because Oakley was convicted of intentionally refusing to pay child 
support, which was a felony in Wisconsin, and could have been imprisoned for 
six years, the probation condition which infringes on his right to procreate was 
valid.8 
I.  RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
While the phrase “right to privacy” is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution,9 courts have found an implicit guarantee of the right to privacy in 
different sections of the Constitution.  In a line of decisions going back as far 
as 1891,10 the Supreme Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, 
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution.11  In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have found 
at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment,12 the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments,13 in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,14 in the Ninth 
 
 5. Id. at 202 (all facts articulated in this section are taken from the court’s opinion in 
Oakley). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 201. 
 8. Id. at 201-02. 
 9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
 10. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891). 
 11. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
 12. See id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). 
 13. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 350 (1967)). 
 14. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)). 
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Amendment,15 or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.16 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no 
“state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law.”17  While courts have not defined the term “liberty” with great 
exactness, it certainly denotes more than just mere freedom from bodily 
restraint.18  As early as 1923, the Supreme Court was declaring that one’s 
liberty included: 
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home 
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.19 
The Supreme Court has recognized that within this zone of privacy lie 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees,20 and in deciding which rights 
are “fundamental” the courts must assess whether there is an explicit or 
implicit guarantee of this right in the Constitution.21 
A. Fundamental Rights 
The Supreme Court has found that several rights not specifically 
mentioned in the Constitution should be protected as fundamental rights.  One 
example of this is the right to marry.22  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
Supreme Court declared that, “Marriage is a coming together for better or 
worse, hopefully enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”23  The 
Supreme Court sees the fundamental rights of personal, marital, familial, and 
sexual privacy to be protected under the Constitution,24 and it is a well-settled 
principle with the Court that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to 
interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about family and parenthood.25 
 
 15. See id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldbert, J., concurring)). 
 16. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 486. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 18. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 21. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). 
 22. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486). 
 25. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (“The right to marry is of 
fundamental importance for all individuals” and “is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ 
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). 
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B. The Right to Procreate as a Fundamental Right 
The Supreme Court has never explicitly guaranteed anyone a liberty 
interest in having a sex drive or in not being temporarily prevented from 
producing offspring.26  However, the Supreme Court recognized a broad right 
to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma.27  Petitioner, Jack Skinner, was convicted 
of the crimes of stealing chickens and robbery with firearms, and he was 
sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory.  Under Oklahoma’s Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act, any habitual criminal convicted of felonies 
involving moral turpitude may have a proceeding brought against them in court 
for a judgment that such a person should be rendered sexually sterile.  The 
Supreme Court decided that because sterilization would permanently deprive 
Skinner of his right to procreate, the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional.28 
Even though the Court decided Skinner purely on equal protection 
grounds, Justice Douglas inferred that procreation is a fundamental right by 
saying, “[W]e are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic 
civil rights of man.  Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race.  The power to sterilize, if exercised, may 
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.”29  Justice Douglas went on 
to state that a “strict scrutiny” analysis must be employed whenever a state’s 
classification authorizes sterilization because such a classification affects a 
fundamental right.30 
The right to have children is a basic human right and an aspect of the 
fundamental liberty that the Constitution zealously guards for all Americans.31  
The Supreme Court has stated that: 
[The] law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education, . . . [and the law protects] the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.32 
Although all of the Supreme Court cases dealing with the fundamental 
right of procreation have been in the context of a permanent deprivation of the 
 
 26. See Runckel, supra note 2, at 566. 
 27. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (all facts articulated in this section are taken 
from the Court’s opinion in Skinner). 
 28. Id. at 541. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. at 536. 
 32. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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right to procreate,33 in broad terms it is well accepted that the right to procreate 
has been declared a fundamental right in our society.  Under the Establishment 
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to 
privacy in our country has been extended to include the right of a person not to 
be permanently deprived of the right to procreate. 
It can be argued that Mr. Oakley’s right to procreate is not a classical 
example of a fundamental right because he is not being permanently deprived 
of this right like other petitioners were in previous procreation cases.34  The 
previous cases that deem the right to procreate as a fundamental right that 
should be strictly scrutinized35 are not necessarily controlling for Mr. Oakley’s 
case.  Those cases deal with issues such as sterilization and irreversibly taking 
away someone’s right to have a child.  Here, in contrast, Mr. Oakley’s right to 
procreate is only being infringed upon for a limited time and by his own 
choice.  If he can prove that he is able to support his current children and any 
future children, he has total freedom to procreate.  This case is not analogous 
to earlier sterilization cases because there is no permanent deprivation of Mr. 
Oakley’s right to procreate.  Whether by supporting his family, waiting out the 
probation sentence, or waiving probation in order to go to prison, Mr. Oakley 
will in a short matter of time be returned the right to procreate as often as he 
chooses.  His right to procreate is merely restricted, not eliminated.36 
However, it is not necessary to examine this argument at great length 
because the constitutionality of Mr. Oakley’s probation condition does not rest 
on whether or not the right to procreate is a fundamentally protected right by 
the Constitution.  Even conceding that the right to procreate is given broad 
constitutional protection as a fundamental right, the condition placed on Mr. 
Oakley’s probation can still pass constitutional scrutiny. 
 
 33. See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (declaring a state sterilization statute 
unconstitutional, stating that “marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.  The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and 
devastating effects . . . .  He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.” (emphasis added)); Casey, 505 
U.S. at 833 (1992) (right to terminate pregnancy affirmed); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(right to terminate pregnancy); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (ban on 
contraception). 
 34. See the situations described in note 33, supra. 
 35. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 36. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208, 212 (Wis. 2001); see also Goodwin v. 
Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (an inmate denied the right to artificially 
inseminate his wife, tried to rely on Skinner v. Oklahoma for support that the right to procreate is 
a fundamental right, but the court stated that “because Skinner involved a permanent deprivation 
of the means to procreate, rather than a mere delay as in petitioner’s case, this Court finds Skinner 
non-dispositive”). 
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II.  STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
Depending on what type of infringement is occurring, there are different 
standards employed for constitutional scrutiny, the highest level of which is 
strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny applies to any government action that calls for 
differential treatment of individuals because of their race, national origin, 
alienage, or any characteristic the Court deems “suspect.”37  When one’s 
“fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that this too deserves a 
strict scrutiny analysis and that any regulation limiting these rights may be 
justified only when there is a compelling state interest, and the legislative 
enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests 
at stake.38 
In practice, for a means to be “narrowly tailored,” there must be no feasible 
alternative available, and it must be the “least-intrusive means” possible.39  
This is the crucial difference from the rational basis test, and it makes the 
“narrowly tailored” prong of the test the most difficult to meet.40  In every 
situation, a feasible alternative can almost always be devised, and the history 
of cases decided under strict scrutiny show that “almost all government actions 
analyzed under strict scrutiny are found unconstitutional.”41  In fact, many 
have described the strict scrutiny test as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”42 
 
 37. Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology For 
“Special Needs” Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 464 (2000). 
 38. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1973); and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). 
 39. Logan, supra note 37, at 464 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989) 
(“[J]udges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine 
some alternative means by which the objectives of the [government] might have been 
accomplished.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J. 
RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 25.02 at 8 (2d ed. 1997) (“[S]trict scrutiny as employed 
by the Court create[s] virtually insurmountable hurdles for the government seeking to defend its 
classification.”)).  Examples of cases where state statutes have been struck down under a strict 
scrutiny analysis include Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute requiring deadbeat 
parents to get court approval before obtaining a marriage license); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting any person from using any drug, medicinal 
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535 (1942) (statute allowing sterilization for habitual felony offenders). 
 42. See Logan, supra note 37, at 464-65 
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B. Intermediate Scrutiny 
The intermediate level of scrutiny was developed as a separate standard 
because there are instances in which neither the rigorous level of strict scrutiny 
nor the deferential standard of rational basis is appropriate.43  Craig v. Boren,44 
the first case to use strict scrutiny, identified gender as the first of the so-called 
“quasi-suspect” classifications that trigger intermediate scrutiny because 
gender meets some of the qualities of suspect classes but not all.45  
Intermediate scrutiny examines whether the legislative enactment serves an 
“important” governmental interest and whether the means used are 
“substantially related” to accomplishing that goal.46 
C. Rational Basis 
If an act is to be reviewed under the rational basis standard, it is presumed 
that the action is a legitimate exercise of governmental discretion.47  
Historically, courts have used the rational basis level of scrutiny when 
evaluating social or economic legislation.48  It is the default method for 
examining assertions of equal protection violations, and it applies unless the 
governmental action uses classifications such as race or sex which have often 
been used as a means of discrimination.49 
When a right involved is not fundamental, the state’s regulation will pass 
constitutional review if it meets the mere rationality test.50  To satisfy this mere 
rationality test, a court only needs to examine whether the act in question 
serves a legitimate governmental interest and whether the classification used is 
rationally related to furthering that governmental interest.51  While rights 
involved still receive constitutional protection under the rational basis test, it is 
an extremely deferential standard and an easy test for legislation to pass.52 
 
 43. See id. at 465 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33 
at 1609-10 (1988)). 
 44. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 45. See Logan, supra note 37, at 465. 
 46. See id. at 465 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 197). 
 47. See id. at 462 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985)). 
 48. See id. at 462-63 (citing Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien 
Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV. 
569, 578 (1994)). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). 
 51. See Logan, supra note 37, at 462-63 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
 52. See id. 
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There have been variations of the rational basis standard used that are 
somewhat more demanding on the government.53  One variation requires a 
“fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”54  Other courts 
have struck down statutes under rational basis scrutiny after undertaking a 
detailed examination of the government’s purposes and means.55  This 
approach has been described as “rational basis with teeth.”56  Although these 
versions of the rational basis test have sometimes provided a level of scrutiny 
higher than just mere rationality, these variations on the traditional rational 
basis test generally still provide a high degree of deference to legislatures.57 
D. Analysis 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s privacy protection forbids the government 
from infringing on fundamental liberty interests of a free person unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.58  Under 
an interpretation that the right to procreate is a fundamental right, Mr. Oakley 
argued that his probation condition warrants strict scrutiny.59  If the restriction 
on Mr. Oakley’s right to procreate in Wisconsin v. Oakley were to be analyzed 
under the strict scrutiny approach, the probation condition must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.60 
Both the majority and dissent agree that there is a compelling state interest 
at stake.61  As the majority in the case points out, refusal to pay child support 
by so-called “deadbeat parents” has fostered a crisis with devastating 
implications for children today.62  In 1997, out of 26.4 billion dollars awarded 
by a court order to custodial mothers, only 15.8 billion dollars was actually 
paid, and these figures only represent a small portion of the child support 
 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 55. See id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (using rational basis scrutiny to strike 
down the denial of a zoning permit for a group home for the retarded because the court found the 
denial was based purely on prejudice); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (invalidating a 
state statute prohibiting use of state funds for education of illegal aliens under a standard 
requiring that the legislation must further a “substantial goal” to demonstrate the rationality of 
denying such a benefit)). 
 56. See Logan, supra note 37, at 462-63 (citing Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah 
Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (1996). 
 57. See id. at 464 (citing Kenji Yoshino, Note, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The 
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 488 n.5 
(1998)). 
 58. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
 59. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Wis. 2001). 
 60. Id. at 208. 
 61. See generally id. 
 62. Id. at 203. 
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obligations that could be collected if every custodial parent had a support 
order.63  Single mothers who do not receive payment of child support often fall 
below the poverty line.64  In addition to long-term consequences of non-
payment of child support such as poor health, behavioral problems, 
delinquency and low educational attainment, inadequate child support is a 
direct contributor to child poverty.65  In our country, approximately twelve 
million children, or about one in every six, live in poverty.66  In the state of 
Wisconsin alone, poverty strikes approximately 200,000 children.67  There is 
little doubt that payment of child support benefits poverty-stricken children,68 
so enforcing child support orders is a compelling state interest. 
The majority in the case also argued that there is a compelling state interest 
in rehabilitating Oakley through probation rather than prison because the 
alternative to probation is incarceration for eight years, which would further 
victimize his children.69 
Although Mr. Oakley concedes that the State’s interest in requiring parents 
to support their children is compelling, he argues that the means employed are 
not narrowly tailored.70  Mr. Oakley believes that his right to procreate is 
effectively eliminated by this condition because he “probably never will have 
the ability to support his children.”71 
The majority of the court argued that this restriction is narrowly tailored 
because Mr. Oakley can satisfy this condition by not intentionally refusing to 
support his current nine children and any future children as required by the 
law.72  The court argued that the condition is narrowly tailored because the 
alternative – eight years in prison – is much broader than this conditional 
impingement on his procreative freedom because it would deprive Mr. Oakley 
of his fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.73  Judge Hazelwood 
of the circuit court actually believed that he was preserving much of Oakley’s 
 
 63. Id. (citing United States Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Current Population 
Survey, Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers, 1997 (1998), available at 
www.census.gov). 
 64. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d. at 204 (citing Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child 
Support Policy in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. 
Melli eds., 2000)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (citing Bernadetter D. Proctor & Joseph Falaker, United States Census Bureau, 
Poverty in the United States vi (2000)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 204. 
 69. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212. 
 70. Id. at 208. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 212. 
 73. Id. 
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liberty through this condition on his probation because he did not send him to 
prison.74 
While the majority in the case seemed to believe that this condition on Mr. 
Oakley’s probation would pass even the strict scrutiny test, the dissent states, 
equally as strong, that this test could never pass that heightened level of 
scrutiny.  The dissent looked to the case of Zablocki v. Redhail75 for help in 
deciding what it means to be “narrowly tailored.”  That case held that a 
Wisconsin statute that prohibited people from marrying until they established 
that their child support obligations were met was not a justifiable means of 
advancing the state’s interest in providing support for children.76  The Court 
held that the Wisconsin law provided other available means of advancing the 
state’s interest that did not infringe upon the liberty interest at stake.77  The 
dissent argued that the Zablocki analysis of “narrowly tailored” applies to this 
case, and because there are several less intrusive means of advancing the 
compelling state interest in ways that do not infringe upon Mr. Oakley’s right 
to procreate, this condition can never pass the heightened strict scrutiny 
analysis.78  Examples of less intrusive remedies would be for Oakley to have 
his probation conditioned on spending a substantial amount of time in jail with 
work release privileges, maintaining two full time jobs, or taking parenting 
classes.79 
The majority of the court in Wisconsin v. Oakley erred by arguing the case 
under a strict scrutiny analysis because it is a losing argument.  Strict scrutiny 
is the highest standard of scrutiny, and under this standard, the means 
employed by the government must be narrowly tailored to advance the 
compelling government interest.80  This requires the least-intrusive means and 
no feasible alternative.81  While the first prong of the test, compelling state 
interest, is clearly met, Mr. Oakley’s probation condition is not narrowly 
tailored.  The dissent points out several realistic alternatives to limiting his 
right to procreate, so it clearly cannot be claimed that there is no feasible 
alternative. 
The majority argued a broader definition of narrowly tailored by claiming 
that Mr. Oakley can easily bypass the restriction on his probation by paying the 
support to his children and that probation is a better alternative to prison.  
While these arguments are compelling, the “narrowly tailored” prong is a high 
 
 74. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213-14. 
 75. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 76. Id. at 388-90. 
 77. Id. at 389. 
 78. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218. 
 79. Id. at 218 n.3. 
 80. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 81. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). 
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level of scrutiny that has been shown to strike down most government actions 
encroaching on fundamental rights.82  The majority in Oakley has misplaced 
their argument because under a strict scrutiny analysis, the restriction on Mr. 
Oakley’s probation that he not have any more children unless he demonstrates 
the ability to support them and that he is supporting the children he already 
has, would be unconstitutional because it is limiting a fundamental right to 
procreate by means that are not narrowly tailored. 
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should lose on its strict scrutiny 
argument, the restriction placed on Mr. Oakley’s probation is not actually 
unconstitutional because strict scrutiny is the wrong standard to apply.  Even 
conceding that the right to procreate is a fundamental right into which an 
encroachment would normally demand strict scrutiny because Mr. Oakley is on 
probation, an infringement on his fundamental rights invoke a lesser standard 
of scrutiny. 
III.  STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY FOR PRISON AND PROBATION 
A. Introduction 
For various reasons, including demographics and the changing size of the 
prison population, conventional intermediate sanctions such as probation, 
parole, and suspended sentences have come to be regarded as valuable 
alternatives to incarceration.83  What has become increasingly popular is the 
imposition of conditions on conventional probationary sentences.84  Typically, 
the court will grant probation subject to a list of specific conditions.85  Classic 
examples of these conditions on probation include substance abuse 
rehabilitation, employment, educational or training programs, confinement, 
monitoring, and others.86  The work-release program, a commonly imposed 
 
 82. Examples of cases where state statutes have been struck down under a strict scrutiny 
analysis include Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute requiring deadbeat parents to 
get court approval before obtaining a marriage license); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting any person from using any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942) (statute allowing sterilization for habitual felony offenders). 
 83. See Developments in the Law – Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 
1944-45 (1998). 
 84. Id. at 1947. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 1947-48 (citing Thomas Bonczar, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Characteristics of 
Adults on Probation, 1995, at 7 (1997) (59% of federal probationers were required to participate 
in rehabilitation programs in 1995, 40% of federal probationers were required to participate in 
employment, educational or training programs, and confinement, monitoring or other restrictions 
were required of 31% of federal probationers in 1995)). 
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condition to probation, has been available since at least 1975 in every state and 
in the federal system,87 and by 1990, home surveillance systems were available 
in all fifty states.88 
Although the concept of probation in a criminal case has its origins in the 
common law, the alternative remedy of probation is now governed by statute.89  
Massachusetts enacted the first probation statute in 1878,90 basing it largely 
upon the groundwork laid by John Augustus.91  A number of states quickly 
followed, and the federal probation legislation was passed in 1925.92  
Currently, all fifty states and the federal government have probation statutes, 
and the number of individuals currently on probation is growing rapidly each 
year.93 
Legislatures give little direction to sentencing courts on how to handle 
probation conditions.94  When describing the scope of a court’s sentencing 
power, courts and commentators have used terms such as “breathtaking” and 
have taken notice of the fact that legislative limitations are “conspicuously 
 
 87. See id. at 1948 (citing ROBERT ROSENBLUM & DEBRA WHITCOMB, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY WORK RELEASE/PRE-RELEASE PROGRAM 11 (1978)). 
 88. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1948 (citing INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 
IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 85-120, 104 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995)). 
 89. See Andrew Horwitz, Note, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some 
Proposals For Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75, 
79-80 (2000) (citing Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When 
Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 47-50 (1981) (discussing the 
evolution of probation)). 
 90. Id. at 80. 
 91. See id. (referring to John Augustus, a Boston cobbler, as the inventor of probation) 
(citing ANDREW KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND 
PROBATION 68 (2d ed. 1997)). 
 92. Id. (citing Greenberg, supra note 89, at 50-52). 
 93. See id. 
In 1984 . . . there were 1.7 million people—one out of every thirty-five adult American 
males—on probationary supervision.  By 1996, that number had skyrocketed to well over 
three million probationers.  The numbers are equally staggering when one looks at the 
percentage of convicted criminals who are placed on probation: forty-nine percent of the 
defendants convicted of a felony in a state court in 1994 were placed on some form of 
probation. 
Id. 
 94. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 80. 
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absent.”95  One media account “suggested that the content of special conditions 
is limited only by the sentencing judge’s imagination.”96 
B. Reliance on Contract, Waiver, and Act of Grace Theories 
When a defendant actually challenges a probation condition, there are 
several procedural obstacles that must be overcome.97  The common feeling 
among courts is that an offender is free to reject the imposition of probation 
and to accept the alternative of incarceration.98  It is therefore believed that 
once a defendant makes the “choice” of probation, he or she is precluded from 
challenging the validity of these probationary conditions.99 
The most common formulation of this preclusion theory is the “contract 
theory,” the foundation of which is the belief that once a probationer accepts 
probation as an alternative to incarceration, he has formed a contractual 
agreement with the sentencing court.100  Both the Supreme Court101 and 
Congress102 have invalidated the contract theory.  Nevertheless, courts have 
continued to use the contract theory in different forms.103 
Another theory employed by courts to justify the imposition of conditions 
on probation is the waiver theory.104  Under this theory, courts will find that by 
accepting any conditions placed on his probation, a defendant has forfeited or 
waived the right to challenge them later.105 
A final theory used to justify probation conditions is the so-called “act of 
grace” theory.106  The act of grace theory has its origins in two United States 
 
 95. Id. at 80, 81 (citing Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); 
Louis K Polonsky, Note, Limitations upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of 
Probation, 8 GA. L. REV. 466, 468 (1974); see also Note, Judicial Review of Probation 
Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 181 (1967) (stating that legislatures are reluctant to devise 
pervasive standards of control)). 
 96. Id. at 81 (citing Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying for Crime Without Serving Time, 
But with a Dose of Humility, TRIAL, May 1997, at 12). 
 97. See id. at 84. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 84. 
 100. See id. (citing Greenberg, supra note 89, at 57). 
 101. Id. (citing Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (finding that “probation is a 
matter of favor, not of contract”); see also Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 274 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (maintaining that probation should not be treated as a “kind of 
bargain”)). 
 102. See id. at 84, 85 (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which declared that 
probation is a sentence in and of itself). 
 103. See id. at 85. 
 104. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 85. 
 105. Id. at 85-86. 
 106. Id. at 88. 
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Supreme Court cases:107 Burns v. United States108 and Escoe v. Zerbst.109  
Although the statements about grace were not part of the central holding of 
these cases,110 courts soon began to rely on these statements about graciously 
giving the convicted probation instead of incarceration.  One commentator has 
described the logic of the act of grace theory as such that: 
[T]he convicted defendant has no right to expect anything less than the full 
penalty prescribed by law.  Thus, the sentencing judge has untrammeled 
discretion to grant or withhold probation, and should he decide to offer the 
offender a modicum of freedom, he may make the grant subject to any 
conditions he believes to be proper.  The probationer will not be heard to 
complain of this voluntary act of clemency, even though the conditions 
imposed are arbitrary, unfair, vague, or otherwise invalid.111 
Like the contract theory, the Supreme Court called for an end to any 
reliance on the act of grace theory, declaring it to be “clear . . . that a 
probationer [could] no longer be denied due process in reliance on the dictum 
in Escoe v. Zerbst that probation is an ‘act of grace.’”112  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s clear rejection of any “act of grace” theory, some appellate courts 
continue to rely on the theory as a justification for denying review of probation 
conditions.113  The act of grace theory frequently appears today couched in 
language such as “probation is not a right but a privilege.”114 
While the contract theory, waiver theory, and act of grace theory may seem 
like appealing arguments to justify why Mr. Oakley should forfeit his right to 
procreate during his probationary period, the Supreme Court and Congress 
have specifically rejected these theories.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to even 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932). 
 109. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935). 
 110. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 89. 
 111. Id. (citing Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 189 
(1967)). 
 112. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (punctuation in original)). 
 113. Id. (citing United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (relying on act 
of grace theory to uphold several probation conditions, including one that precluded association 
with “known homosexuals”); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(noting that “some reviewing courts continue to give lip service to the act of grace theory even 
though the United States Supreme Court has repudiated it”); State v. Kohlman, 854 P.2d 318, 319 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on act of grace theory to uphold unspecified probation conditions); 
State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 1977) (relying on act of grace theory and applying 
probation review standards to uphold several bail conditions that prohibited defendant from 
participating in activities of American Indian Movement)). 
 114. See id. at 90 (citing Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Ct., 159 Cal. Rptr 74, 77 (Cal Ct. App. 
1979) (commenting that probation is a privilege, not a right); State v. Heyn, 456 N.W. 2d 157, 
160 (Wis. 1990) (probation is privilege, not a right)). 
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undergo an analysis of these theories.  The only justification for Mr. Oakley’s 
probation condition passing constitutional muster is under the theory that 
probation, like prison, is subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny. 
C. Prison Restrictions Are Not Analyzed under Strict Scrutiny 
The greatest challenge to probation regulations is that these innovative 
sentences imposed by sentencing courts infringe on one’s fundamental 
rights.115  To properly understand what analysis probation conditions should 
receive, it is important to first look at what constitutional standard of scrutiny 
is used when fundamental rights of prisoners are infringed upon. 
The leading case on the standard of scrutiny in the prison context is Turner 
v. Safley.116  Two regulations were at issue in that case: a regulation on the type 
of correspondence inmates were allowed to have with other inmates, and a 
marriage regulation permitting an inmate to marry only with the permission of 
the prison superintendent and only when there is a compelling reason to 
provide this approval.117  The Supreme Court started its analysis of this case 
with the proposition that: “[P]rison walls do not form a barrier separating 
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”118  However, the 
Court then went into a lengthy analysis of several cases involving prisoners’ 
rights119 and ultimately concluded that “in none of these . . . ‘prisoners’ rights’ 
cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny.”120  The Court 
resolved the question of what constitutional standard to apply to prison 
regulations when it stated that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.  In our view, such a standard is necessary if 
‘prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult 
judgments concerning institutional operations.’”121 
The Turner Court listed several factors that are relevant in determining the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation.  First, there must be a “valid, rational 
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental 
interest put forward to justify it.122  The governmental objective must also be 
legitimate and neutral.123  A second factor is whether there are alternative 
 
 115. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1949. 
 116. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 117. Id. at 81-82. 
 118. Id. at 84-87. 
 119. Id. (analyzing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ 
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)). 
 120. Id. at 87. 
 121. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
 122. Id. at 90. 
 123. Id. 
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means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.124  A third 
condition is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will 
have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources 
generally.125  The final factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a 
prison regulation is that the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the 
reasonableness of the regulation.126 
An example of how this lesser standard of scrutiny in the prison context 
works is best shown through a comparison of two cases on the fundamental 
right of marriage and procreation.  At issue in the 1978 case of Zablocki v. 
Redhail127 was a statute stating that any person with an obligation to pay child 
support to a child not in their custody must obtain court permission to marry.128  
Mr. Redhail was not on probation, parole, or incarcerated when he challenged 
the constitutionality of this statue.  The Court in Zablocki held that the statute 
was unconstitutional because Mr. Redhail’s fundamental right to marry was 
infringed, and the statute could not pass a heightened standard of strict 
scrutiny.129 
In contrast to this case is the 1994 case of Hernandez v. Coughlin.130  
Hernandez, an inmate, brought an action against state correction officials for 
denying him conjugal visitation rights.  While acknowledging that many 
constitutional guarantees survive incarceration,131 the Second Circuit relied on 
Supreme Court precedent to hold that a prisoner’s fundamental right to marry 
is substantially limited as a result of incarceration.132  The court found it 
significant to note that Hernandez possessed the right to maintain his 
procreative abilities for later use once released from custody.133 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the 1987 case of O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz,134 made this distinction between the rights of a free person and the 
rights of one incarcerated even more clear.  He stated that “lawful incarceration 
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal 
system.”135  Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that prison regulations that 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. 
 127. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 128. Id. at 375. 
 129. Id. at 388. 
 130. Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 131. Id. at 136 (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). 
 132. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78. 
 135. Id. at 348. 
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allegedly infringed on constitutional rights were to be judged under a 
“reasonableness” test which was less restrictive than the test of strict scrutiny 
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional 
rights.136  In describing the “reasonableness test,” the Court relied upon the 
four factors set out by the Turner v. Safely court to determine the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation.137 
Later cases have built upon this fundamental idea that the reasonableness 
standard is to be applied to cases where a prisoner’s fundamental rights are 
being restricted, even if the State under other circumstances would be required 
to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review.138  It is now a well-settled 
principle that a prisoner’s fundamental rights are subject to a lower standard of 
constitutional scrutiny under the “reasonableness test.”  Cases of this nature 
include139 infringements upon the fundamental right of First Amendment 
freedom of speech,140 First Amendment freedom of association,141 First 
 
 136. Id. at 347. 
 137. Id. at 350-53.  The four factors from Turner were: (1) valid, rational connection between 
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) 
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, (3) impact 
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on 
the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) reasonableness of a prison regulation is that 
the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation.  Id. 
 138. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he proper standard for 
determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional 
rights is to ask whether the regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.’”). 
 139. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d, 200, 212 n.27 (Wis. 2001) (all examples of the cases 
cited hereinafter in footnotes 140-47 of this note come from this opinion). 
 140. State v. Miller, 499 N.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that probation 
condition prohibiting probationer from telephoning any woman not a member of his family 
without prior permission was a reasonable and not overly broad infringement); United States v. 
Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) (asserting that probation condition requiring defendant 
convicted of obstructing a federal court order to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or picketing 
in front of any abortion family planning service center a permissible restriction because it was 
reasonably related to the goal of prohibiting further illegal conduct); United States v. Terrigno, 
838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding probation condition that defendant not speak for 
money about her crime, even though it infringed on her right to free speech, because it was 
reasonably related to her rehabilitation); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 467 (3rd Cir. 
1987) (upholding probation condition that defendant refrain from representing union as elected 
official or paid employee because significant imposition upon defendant’s First Amendment 
rights was “reasonable in light of the offense”). 
 141. Turner, 44 F.3d at 903 (ruling that probation condition prohibiting defendant from 
harassing, intimidating or picketing in front of any abortion family planning services center 
permissible restriction of First Amendment freedom of association when convicted of obstructing 
federal court order and restriction reasonably related to goal of prohibiting further illegal 
conduct); United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542-43 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding as 
reasonable a probation condition that prohibited the defendant from representing or serving as 
officer in Communications Workers of America constitutionally permissible when defendant 
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Amendment freedom of religion,142 Second Amendment right to bear arms,143 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,144 
the right to engage in political activity or run for political office,145 freedom of 
movement,146 and the right to procreate.147 
 
convicted of violations of IRS Code and federal false statements statutes); United States v. 
Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding probation condition that prevented 
defendant from participating in any motorcycle club activities as reasonably related to the 
defendant’s rehabilitation where he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon); 
Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing probation condition that 
prohibited defendant from associating with Irish cultural, political, or social organizations as 
reasonably related to the goals of probation—thereby constitutionally permissible—when 
defendant, Irish Republican Army sympathizer, convicted of gun running). 
 142. United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 38 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that probation 
condition prohibiting Native American juveniles who pleaded guilty to simple assault from 
possessing firearms until age twenty-one is constitutionally permissible even though hunting with 
firearm is an important religious ritual to juveniles because probation condition reasonably served 
statutory goals of punishment, deterrence and public protection). 
 143. See generally Rice v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (ruling that 
Congress could restrict a person’s right to possess a firearm, after a conviction for possession of 
firearms by a convicted felon, even when a pardon was granted with regard to the underlying 
felony). 
 144. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987) (upholding Wisconsin law allowing a 
search of a probationer’s home as long as the probation officer has “reasonable grounds” to 
believe the presence of contraband and reiterating its Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 
language that “probationers . . . do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
restrictions.’”). 
 145. U.S. v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that probation condition on 
elected official convicted of attempting to extort bribe lawfully prevented that official from 
seeking or serving in elected public office during period of probation were valid because it would 
assist in the probationer’s rehabilitation and protect the public); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 
144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (ruling that probationer convicted of violating federal election laws 
could be lawfully prohibited from running for political office or engaging in political activities 
during period of probation because the condition was reasonably related to the probationer’s 
rehabilitation). 
 146. United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding probation condition 
that prohibited defendants convicted of entering a submarine base illegally from coming within 
250 feet of the base was reasonable “[g]iven the alternatives of imprisonment or some other 
greater restriction” upon the defendant’s rights of movement, association, and speech); State v. 
Cooper, 282 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (N.C. 1981) (ruling that probation condition prohibiting 
defendant from operating a motor vehicle on the public streets and highways between 12:01 a.m. 
and 5:30 a.m. was reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation where defendant pled guilty to 
fourteen crimes involving the use of stolen credit cards). 
 147. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting strict scrutiny of 
probation condition that required defendant to complete drug counseling and anger management 
treatment before fathering any future children); Krebs v. Schwarz 568 N.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1997) (upholding probation condition that required defendant convicted of sexually 
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D. The Similarities of Prison and Probation 
While there have been no major court rulings on what constitutional 
standard of scrutiny to apply to probationers,148 court rulings have made it 
clear that probation and prison are similar enough to warrant the same lower 
standard of scrutiny for restrictions on a probationer’s fundamental rights.  The 
Supreme Court has held that “Probation, like incarceration, is a form of 
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or 
plea of guilt . . . .  Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set 
of points) on a continuum of possible punishments.”149  The Supreme Court 
has made clear that probationers do not enjoy the same absolute freedom to 
which every citizen is entitled, but instead, a “conditional liberty” that is 
dependent on observance of their special probation restrictions150 that in 
themselves infringe on constitutional rights.151 
There is a great public interest in the protection of the community that 
justifies treating incarceration and probation similarly.152  Although it may be 
argued that probationers were not sentenced to prison and therefore deserve a 
stronger degree of government protection, this reasoning is flawed.153  “By 
definition, a prisoner is not a risk to the community.”154  In contrast, a 
probationer’s freedom represents a continuing risk to the community because 
he is more inclined to commit a crime than a law-abiding citizen.155  Therefore, 
closely supervising a probationer is the only way a state can reduce the risk to 
the community that the probationer will violate the law again, and this 
accordingly justifies a high level of intrusion into probationer’s rights.156  
“Furthermore, although probationers certainly have a greater expectation of 
privacy than prisoners, any reasonable expectation of privacy must be less than 
that of law-abiding persons.”157 
 
assaulting his daughter to obtain permission from his probation agent prior to engaging in sexual 
relationship was reasonable and not overly broad). 
 148. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 n.2 (“We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly 
infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are reasonably related 
to legitimate penological interests.  We have no occasion in this case to decide where, as a general 
matter, that test applies to probation regulations as well.”). 
 149. See id. at 874. 
 150. See Logan, supra note 37, at 481 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Logan, supra note 37, at 481 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880 (“[I]t is the very 
assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is 
more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law . . . .”)). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
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E. Analysis 
When a person is convicted of a crime and sent to prison, he loses certain 
rights that people not violating the law may enjoy.  Since the Court has held 
that prisoners deserve a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny158 and that 
probation and prison contain some of the same fundamental characteristics, it 
is a logical extension of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
“reasonableness test”159 in the prison context to apply it to the probation 
context. 
The “reasonableness test” was formulated for the prison context, and it is 
necessary to adapt its prongs to fit the different context of probation.  Under 
the first prong of the test, one looks to see if there is a “valid, rational 
connection”160 between the probation regulation and the legitimate government 
interest justifying it.  Mr. Oakley conceded that there exists a compelling 
government interest in a father paying child support and not having any more 
children below the poverty line.  Because Mr. Oakley has shown an intentional 
disregard for his children and the law mandating him to support his children, it 
is not hard to see a connection between a restriction forbidding him from 
procreating until he shows he can support all of his current children, which is 
the government’s legitimate interest. 
The second factor in the Turner test asks if there are “alternative means of 
exercising the right that remain open.”161  Mr. Oakley still has the right to 
engage in sexual activity, and alternatives to his restriction would be for Mr. 
Oakley to get two jobs or take parenting classes to show that he could support 
his children.  By employing these alternatives, Mr. Oakley would then be able 
to exercise his right to procreate again. 
The third factor is unique to the prison context and is not directly 
applicable to the probation context.  It deals with what kind of “ripple 
effect”162 the asserted right would have on guards and inmates in the closed 
environment of the correctional institution.  Because probationers naturally 
have more freedom than an inmate confined to prison, instead of fellow 
probationers or his probation officer feeling the “ripple effect,” the people 
being affected by Mr. Oakley asserting his right to procreate would be his 
current children, future children, the mothers of these children, and the 
community at large supporting his children who have fallen below the poverty 
line. 
 
 158. See generally O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 159. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 160. Id. at 89. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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The final factor in the reasonableness test is an analysis of whether there 
are alternatives to the restriction that would achieve the same goal.163  The 
Turner court makes clear to point out that “this is not a ‘least restrictive 
alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down 
every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s 
constitutional complaint.”164  There are no reasonable alternatives to the 
probation condition imposed on Mr. Oakley that would achieve the same goal 
of protecting the children.  Mr. Oakley has had numerous opportunities to 
support his children, and yet he continues to intentionally disregard the 
mandate to support them.  Conditioning his probation on getting several jobs to 
pay his support does not seem to be a realistic alternative. 
F. Other Constitutional Tests Used for Probation Restrictions 
While the Supreme Court has never articulated a clear standard for how to 
scrutinize probation restrictions, several appellate level courts have created 
their own tests.  In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,165 the Ninth Circuit 
considered the legality of a condition that required the probationer to “submit 
to a search of her person or property at any time when requested by a law-
enforcement officer.”166  The court created the following standard for its 
analysis:167 “In determining whether a reasonable relationship exists, we have 
found it necessary to give consideration to the purposes sought to be served by 
probation, the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees available to 
those under probation should be accorded probationers, and the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement.”168  Several jurisdictions have adopted this three 
part test to analyze probation conditions.169 
Under this lesser standard of scrutiny, it is obvious that Mr. Oakley’s 
condition would pass constitutional muster.  The purpose of giving Mr. Oakley 
probation instead of incarceration is to rehabilitate him into a law abiding 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 
 165. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 166. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 101 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez , 521 F.2d at 261). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 262. 
 169. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 101 (citing United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (applying restated version of Consuelo-Gonzalez test and noting “broad discretion” of 
the trial judge in establishing probation conditions); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 
(5th Cir. 1979) (discussing former congressman who violated Federal Election Campaign Act on 
probation with the restriction not to engage in any political activity and court held that “a 
condition of probation satisfies the statute so long as it is reasonably related to rehabilitation of 
the probationer, protection of the public against other offenses during its term, deterrence of 
future misconduct by the probationer or general deterrence of others, condign punishment or 
some combination of these objectives.”)). 
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father who pays child support while giving him the opportunity to make money 
and develop relationships with his children.  Courts have stated that a person’s 
right to procreate while in prison is not an absolute right, and thus the same can 
apply to probation.  Additionally, with the overwhelming number of children 
below the poverty line, there is an obvious need for some law enforcement and 
judicial control over a parent intentionally refusing to pay child support. 
Another standard applied to analyze probation conditions is the 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.170  This balancing test involves four 
factors: (1) the nature of the right affected; (2) the degree of the infringement 
of the right; (3) the nature of the benefit conferred; and (4) the nature of the 
state’s interest in conditioning the benefit.171  This too has been a valid test 
used by a number of courts and commentators to analyze the constitutionality 
of probation conditions.172 
Another standard of scrutiny that has been applied to probation, and the 
standard adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Oakley, is 
that “the conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as 
long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the defendant’s 
rehabilitation.”173  Followers of this standard adopt the American Bar 
Association standard that: 
Conditions imposed by the court should be designed to assist the probationer in 
leading a law-abiding life.  They should be reasonably related to his 
rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his 
freedom of religion.  They should not be so vague or ambiguous as to give no 
real guidance.174 
G. Analysis 
Although it may be argued that the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation 
would not pass strict scrutiny, “probation conditions – like prison regulations – 
 
 170. See id. at 105. 
 171. See id. at 105-06. 
 172. See id. at 106 (citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(asserting that unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires that conditions impinging on 
constitutional rights be reasonably related to compelling state interest in rehabilitation and that no 
less restrictive alternative be available); Michael G. Honeymar, Jr., Note, Alcoholics Anonymous 
as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation: When Does it Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 439 n.9 (1997) (“Various commentators have applied this doctrine to 
analyze the constitutionality of certain probationary conditions.”)). 
 173. Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Miller, 499 N.W. 
2d 215, 216 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
 174. See Miller, 499 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting A.B.A., Standards Relating to Probation, Sec. 
3.2(b), at 44 (Approved Draft 1970)). 
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are not subject to strict scrutiny.”175  As the Wisconsin Supreme Court points 
out, if probation conditions were subject to strict scrutiny, then incarceration, a 
more severe punitive sanction which deprives individuals of their right to be 
free from physical restraint and infringes upon numerous fundamental rights, 
would also be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis.176  If probation conditions 
were subject to strict scrutiny, it leads to one of two illogical and unworkable 
conclusions: (1) strict scrutiny for conditions of probation that infringe upon 
fundamental rights but not for the more restrictive alternative of incarceration, 
or (2) the state must meet the heavy burden of strict scrutiny every time it is 
confronted with someone who has violated the law.177 
While adhering to the constitutional standard of mere rationality, the 
Wisconsin v. Oakley court states that the proper test for this analysis is that 
“conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as 
they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person’s 
rehabilitation.”178 
Applying this reasonability standard, the majority of the court found that 
Mr. Oakley’s condition was not overly broad because it did not eliminate Mr. 
Oakley’s ability to exercise his constitutional right to procreate.179  His right 
was merely restricted, and the condition on his probation could be satisfied by 
making efforts to support his children as required by law or the condition 
expiring at the end of his probation term.180 
While acknowledging that the “no more children” probation condition 
certainly appears to be reasonably related to Mr. Oakley’s rehabilitation,181 the 
dissent argues that even in light of the state’s strong interest in protecting 
against the further victimization of Mr. Oakley’s children, this court-ordered 
condition on procreation is overly broad.182  The court again relies on 
Zablocki183 to state that because there are several alternate ways to achieve the 
state’s goals of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley and making him a supportive father 
to his nine children, this condition is overly broad.184 
 
 175. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208 n.23 (Wis. 2001). 
 176. Id. (citing Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is This Right Different 
from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994) (advocating strict scrutiny every time an 
individual is incarcerated because fundamental rights are being infringed upon)). 
 177. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208. 
 178. Id. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
 179. Id. at 212. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 182. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 183. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 184. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 221-22 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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In light of the overwhelming consensus that this constitutional test is 
liberal and easily passable, the dissent’s arguments go more toward refuting a 
strict scrutiny analysis.  If the appropriate test is the rational basis test, then the 
condition, which is limited in scope and able to be overcome by Mr. Oakley 
taking responsibility and supporting his children, cannot be said to be 
overbroad. 
Likewise, this condition on his probation passes the second prong of the 
rational basis test.  Because Mr. Oakley’s crime was failing to support his 
children, a probation condition dealing with procreative rights is reasonably 
related to the state’s goal of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley and making him a 
supportive father.  The State in the case argues that the condition essentially 
bans Oakley from violating the law again.185  Future violations of the law 
would be detrimental to Oakley’s rehabilitation, which necessitates preventing 
him from continuing to disregard its dictates.  So the condition on his 
probation is reasonably related to his rehabilitation because it will assist Mr. 
Oakley in conforming his conduct to the law.186  Because the rational basis test 
is such an easy standard for this condition on probation to pass, there is no real 
doubt that this clause in Mr. Oakley’s terms of probation passes constitutional 
review under this lower scrutiny standard. 
It is clear from Supreme Court decisions that strict scrutiny is not the 
appropriate test to apply to probation conditions.  While no clear test has been 
articulated for the probation context, it is apparent that Mr. Oakley’s probation 
condition would pass constitutional scrutiny under any of these lower 
standards of scrutiny.  Whether the appropriate test is the rational basis test, 
reasonableness test, or some combination of the two, the important point to 
recognize is that strict scrutiny is not the appropriate test to apply to probation 
conditions, and therefore, the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation is 
constitutional. 
H. Examples of Constitutional Probation Conditions 
Probation conditions of all kinds in all different jurisdictions have been 
held to be constitutional.187  In establishing the fact that convicted individuals 
 
 185. Id. at 213. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting abortion 
protestor convicted of obstructing a federal court order from harassing, intimidating or picketing 
in front of any abortion family planning services center was probation condition was permissible 
restriction upon protestor’s First Amendment right of free speech and association given that 
restriction was reasonably related to the goal of prohibiting further illegal conduct); State v. 
Miller, 499 N.W.2d 204, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining condition of probation which 
prohibited defendant from telephoning any woman not a member of his own family without 
permission of a probation officer was valid and not unreasonable). 
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do not enjoy the same liberty and freedom as citizens who have not violated 
the law,188 the Wisconsin Supreme Court points to the case of State v. Kline189 
for support of its condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation.  In Kline, the defendant 
was a physically and emotionally abusive father, who, when high on 
methamphetamine, regularly abused his children.190  At one point, the 
defendant broke his son’s arm, and when he and his wife subsequently had 
another child, the defendant caused a spiral fracture in his two and a half 
month old baby’s leg and bruised her head and chest.191  The defendant was 
sentenced to probation for all of these heinous acts with the condition that, 
among other things, he obtain prior written approval of the court before 
fathering any future children.192  Although the defendant argued that this 
condition deserved strict scrutiny for violating his right to procreate, the 
Oregon appellate court denied this and determined that the condition was valid 
because it “did not impose a total ban on defendant’s reproductive rights . . . 
[it] provide[d] potential victims with protection from future injury and 
interfere[d] with defendant’s fundamental rights to a permissible degree.”193 
In a similar case, a condition on probation was upheld that required a 
defendant who sexually assaulted his own daughter to obtain his probation 
agent’s permission before entering into an intimate or sexual relationship.194  
Although the condition infringed upon a constitutional right, the Wisconsin 
appellate court held that it was reasonable and not overly broad.195 
I. Different Rationales for Probation 
There are four different rationales used to support and justify putting a 
person on probation.  The traditional rationale is that probation is for the 
purpose of offender rehabilitation.196  “Most criminal statutes explicitly state 
that the purpose of intermediate sanctions is to rehabilitate,197 and the Supreme 
Court has noted that the purpose of probation is to provide a young or 
unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institutional 
 
 188. Von Arx v. Schwarz, 517 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 189. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
 190. Id. at 698. 
 191. Id. at 698-99. 
 192. Id. at 699. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See generally Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
 195. Id. at 28. 
 196. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1956. 
 197. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.187(1) (1997) (permitting judges to impose alternatives 
to incarceration so as to “best serve the needs of society, punish criminal offenders, and provide 
the opportunity for rehabilitation”); IOWA CODE § 907.7 (1997) (“[T]he purposes of probation are 
to provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant.”)). 
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confinement.”198  Another traditional rationale to support probation is the idea 
of public protection.199  Although incarceration is the ultimate form of public 
protection, the probation system has also been used to protect the public by 
imposing restrictions on a probationer’s freedom through various conditions on 
his or her probation.200  Two less traditional rationales for probation are the 
ideas of just punishment for the probationer and deterrence for the probation in 
committing future crimes.201 
Wisconsin law gives judges great latitude in choosing between 
incarceration and probation.  In sentencing, a Wisconsin judge can take into 
account a broad variety of factors including: the gravity of the offense; the 
need for protection of the public and potential victims; the past record of 
criminal offenses; any history of undesirable behavior patterns; defendant’s 
personality, character, and social traits; the results of a pre-sentence 
investigation; the vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; the degree of 
defendant’s culpability; the defendant’s demeanor at trial; the defendant’s age, 
educational background, and employment record; the defendant’s remorse, 
repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant’s need for close rehabilitative 
control; the rights of public; and the length of pretrial detention.202 
Wisconsin Statute § 973.09(1)(a) provides that: 
[I]f a person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, may withhold 
sentence or impose sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in 
either case place the person on probation to the department for a stated period, 
stating in the order the reasons therefore.  The court may impose any 
conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate.203 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court notes that the purpose of the probation statute is 
to rehabilitate the defendant and protect society without placing the defendant 
in prison.204 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court believed that giving Mr. Oakley probation 
was a better alternative to incarceration.  “When a judge allows a convicted 
individual to bypass a prison sentence and enjoy the relative freedom of 
probation, it is within the judge’s discretion to take reasonable measures to 
further the objective of rehabilitation and protect society and potential victims 
from future wrongdoing.”205  Restrictions are meant to assure that the 
 
 198. See id. at 1956-57 (citing Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943)). 
 199. See id. at 1960. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1962-63. 
 202. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Wis. 2001) (quoting State v. Guzman, 
480 N.W.2d 446 (1992)). 
 203. See id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (1998)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 206. 
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probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community 
is not harmed by the probationer being at large.206 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause implicitly includes a right to privacy, which, in turn, includes 
the fundamental right to procreate.  If a law-abiding citizen’s right to procreate 
was being infringed upon, that person would deserve the highest level of strict 
scrutiny to determine if the infringement was constitutional.  However, 
prisoners and probationers are subject to a more conditional form of liberty.  
Prisoners are not afforded strict scrutiny for infringement of their fundamental 
rights, and because probation and prison share many similarities, a probationer 
is likewise not afforded the highest level of scrutiny when his rights are 
infringed.  Although courts disagree over which lesser standard to apply to 
probationer’s rights, the important fact to recognize is that until the Supreme 
Court announces a specific level of scrutiny to use for probationers, courts are 
justified in adopting any standard of scrutiny as long as it is not strict scrutiny. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Oakley, chose to use the 
“rational basis test” to evaluate Mr. Oakley’s probation condition.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the holding in Wisconsin v. Oakley 
is a narrow holding for an extraordinary set of facts.207  However, the decision 
by this court is proper in light of the circumstances.  Under the rational basis 
standard, the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation is not overly broad and is 
reasonably related to his rehabilitation.  Mr. Oakley’s ability to procreate is 
only restricted, not eliminated, and if he were sent to prison, he would not be 
able to exercise his procreation rights anyway.  When Mr. Oakley intentionally 
committed the crime of refusing to support his children, he gave up certain 
rights and freedoms.  Given the overwhelming problems that coincide with 
children in poverty, the state of Wisconsin has a compelling interest in 
protecting their youth.  If Mr. Oakley is on probation, he can work two jobs, 
make money to support his family, and build a relationship with his nine 
children.  Given the compelling reasons to give Mr. Oakley probation over 
incarceration, a condition that protects children, simultaneously assists him in 
his rehabilitation, and possibly deters him from future criminality can only be 
viewed as a positive step by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
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